jeudi 27 janvier 2011

The US role in the Tunisian Revolution

General Rashid Ammar


During the Jasmine revolution that swept Ben Ali from power, the United States played a pivotal behind the scenes role. While this story has been largely neglected by news sources in the US, it has become big news in both France and Tunisia. The story first broke after the astounding revelation of the French Foreign secretary. While under heavy scrutiny for her response to the street demonstrations, Alliot-Marie admitted that,


“We in the Elysee did not see this coming. It was the Americans who took matters in hand. They were convinced that the survival of the regime though violence, would plant the seeds for the Islamists. The U.S. military talked with their Tunisian Counterpart and Ben Ali was asked to leave the territory without further delay.”

According to Middle East expert Mathieu Guidere, the US ambassador met with Major General Rashid Ammar, and told him that the United States no longer would support Ben Ali. (A US Wikileak cable characterized the regime as Mafioso, so this could not have been a big surprise.) We do not know exactly what was said, but it was clear that afterward, the Tunisian General suddenly took matters into his own hands and told Ben Ali that he would refuse any order to attack the street demonstrators and was summarily sacked. But with the army in clear defiance, Ben Ali was on a plane for Saudi Arabia in less than 24 hours. General Ammar has not only regained his position, but is an important force in the upcoming election.

Many are characterizing Tunisia as a “clarion call for a regional awakening,” yet the important role of the US during the coup raises questions about whether this revolution could reproduce in neighboring Arab countries. The speed of the coup was not a result of the intensity of the demonstration but rather because of an agreement between the military and the US, which left Ben Ali isolated. His only support was the large, unwieldy and demoralized police and security forces which were no match for the size and intensity of the demonstrators back by the Tunisian Army. For this reason Tunisia can be seen as a special case, because the regime could not count on the support from its own Army, nor could it drum up islamophobia to draw in Western support. The lack of extremist Islamic elements in Tunisia meant that the United States could not be compelled to come to Ben Ali’s rescue. On the contrary, because the demonstrations were largely made up of pro democratic progressive students, the US felt that the safest action was to work with anti-Ben Ali elements in the military to bring the revolution to fruition.

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