Egyptian surprises

Perhaps the biggest surprise for me, and certainly the thing that I got most wrong was how the protesters would initially see the military. I assumed that the protesters would see the military the same way that they saw the police. This seemed logical because because the regime was as much a military state as it was a police state. I thought that the decisive moment would occur when the military took over. The inevitable confrontation would end with a decisive victory for Mubarak because there are too many forces internally and externally backing the military because they are scared to death of a coup. Egypt would not end in a coup as in Tunisia.

The arrival of the military did not lead to confrontation. Instead the soldiers were initially treated like liberators, the military not wanting to create another confrontation let the protesters continue their protests while still tacitly backing Mubarak. Bizarre images of protesters and soldiers intermingled were broadcast across the world.

There are signs that this truce might be beginning to end. The military has asked that the protesters go home, a demand completely unacceptable to the protesters who want to see Mubarak ousted. We will see in the next couple of days how this stand off ends.

Here is the best article on the role of the military in Egypt:

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/world/middleeast/29forces.html?scp=3&sq=egypt%20army&st=cse

What next?

We now know that Mubarak is going to step down one way or another. The question remains whether it will be a quick relatively bloodless coup as in Tunisia. Or whether the regime will try to stagger into the fall election. I definitely think that while both cases poses risks, the second one may well be more dangerous. If he stays in power as a figurehead, you know that conspiracy theories are going to abound about everything from western manipulation, to voter tampering, and intimidation, sectarian violence might explode which could have extremely deleterious effect on US security.

It seems clear that the US needs to change course: continuing to demand reforms was stupid a week ago, now it is completely irrelevant. Mubarak has agreed to leave before the next election, today's Mubarak is completely powerless and is completely at the mercy of the military, who have basically taken over the country. Surprisingly, the emergence of El Baradei has given the US something of an outlet. He is a moderate politicians who seems well respected by all sides. The US now can make the case (as they did in Tunisia) that Mubarak immediately step down and leave Egypt. This would do two things, it would put the US clearly on the side of the protesters and might give slightly better odds that the new regime will have some similar interests as the US.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Egypt

Here is Ed Kenney's take on Egypt:

Hosni Mubarak is on his way out as President of Egypt. The protests have reached the critical tipping point: labor strikes are on schedule for Tuesday along with a million man march. The Egyptian military, which ultimately will decide the fate of the embattled president, has already shown an inability or unwillingness to control the streets. Soon its desire to preserve its reputation in post-Mubarak Egypt will force it to act against the president. For the Americans two questions remain: how will this unrest affect U.S. interests and what can be done policy-wise to manage the situation.

Before addressing these questions, it makes sense to debunk some of the myths that have pervaded the conversation up to this point, especially with regards to U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.

Myth #1: The U.S. is in a position to dictate the future of Egypt.

This myth takes a variety of forms. Some argue that the U.S. has the ability to push Mubarak out of power. Undoubtedly, once he leaves conspiracy theories involving nefarious U.S. involvement will proliferate. In reality, the U.S. has relatively few policy levers to influence events in Egypt which will determined by protesters and the military. What can the U.S. do? We can issue public statements in support or defense of the current regime, we can withhold or continue to supply military aid—or use military aid as a bargaining chip. We can use our close relationship with the military to gather intelligence, and we can work with other countries in the region (Israel, perhaps?) to diffuse the international element. The U.S. cannot dictate Egypt future; we cannot force Mubarak to leave.

Myth #2 (Corollary to Myth #1): The events in Egypt prove the U.S. should have pushed stronger for reforms.

Those who argue that the U.S. should have pushed more aggressively for reforms make two mistakes. They ignore the trade-offs regarding other national interests and the overestimate our ability to create change. The U.S. has a close relationship with Egypt for a number of reasons. Mubarak’s predecessor Anwar Sadat broke with the Soviet Union and recognized Israel, and since the 1990s, Egypt has also collaborated in the battle against Muslim extremists. If the U.S. were to focus on political reforms this would divert resources from these other critical areas of national security. Even if you believe democracy is more important than anti-terror or the security of Israel, you have to also believe that the U.S. can successfully achieve political change simply by asking for it. Given that undemocratic regimes seldom survive the reform process and have every incentive to resist this process, this is a highly dubious assertion.

Myth #3: Mubarak has been a “reliable partner for the U.S.”

Events in Egypt prove that Mubarak has not been a reliable partner to the US. As a general rule of thumb, reliable partners do not get overthrown in popular uprisings. The reason Washington is holding its breath is that the there is no guarantee that the current Egyptian policy towards either Israel or anti-terror will be adopted by the next regime, particularly if the Muslim Brotherhood takes power. Mubarak has lost his legitimacy, it remains to be seen whether his government’s policies have as well.

There is a reason the U.S. prefers to do business with democracies quite apart from the “democracy is good everyone deserves liberty” rhetoric. Under a democracy the transition of power is relatively predictable. We can be relatively sure that U.S.-Japanese relations will not change wholesale, even if a new government comes in opposing the Okinawa base, for instance. Under a dictatorship the transition from power is usually messy, and the dictator is almost always wholly discredited.

What can be done?

While the U.S. cannot dictate Egypt’s future, there are actions that can be taken to improve the likelihood that the next government is pro-American. We can work the backchannels to improve the likelihood that the transition is smooth. Secretary of Defense reportedly talked to military counterparts in Egypt, yesterday. He is undoubtedly assuring them that U.S. military aid will continue even if Mubarak is removed. The U.S. should also be talking to Israel, diffusing the tension that our most important Middle Eastern ally feels at this moment in time. If Israel feels threatened and takes action, even defensive action, this could be interpreted in Egypt the wrong way, lending support to the radical parties’ anti-Semitic agenda.

By all accounts the Obama administration is working behind the scenes and around the clock using private channels. But public diplomacy is equally important in this situation and thus far the administration’s policy of public hedging is counter-productive. The U.S. needs to recognize the political realities on the ground, ask Mubarak to step down, and demand new fair elections. This is not a question of “being on the right side of history” in the traditional sense. Democracy, unfortunately, does not always triumph as the green revolution in Iran proved in 2009. In Egypt however, democratic forces will triumph, so it makes no sense for the U.S. to continue to back a losing horse. By refusing to openly side with the protesters in the street, we risk having the democrats turn against us and reduce the probability that the next government will be more amenable to our interests.

There are two risks to publicly supporting the democrats, which I will briefly outline, neither of which is compelling. First, some argue that public pronouncements will impede our ability to manage the situation. This argument seems to fall under myth #1. The U.S. cannot dictate events in Cairo; a bold statement cannot undermine a power the U.S. does not have to begin with. The second argument is that by “pulling the rug” out from under Mubarak, we send a message to other autocrats that our support is unreliable. I don’t see this as that big a problem. Our support for autocrats should not be unconditional. Sending a message that we look out for our own interests and will back democratic forces if they look like they have a chance of winning seems entirely reasonable. A public statement in support of free elections does not dramatically change the strategic calculation of our other allies in the war on terror or the defense of Israel and it might even encourage some of our less savory allies to preemptively begin reforms. For all of these reasons, and to re-establish out moral authority, the U.S. needs to take a bold public stand for democracy in Egypt.

obama tiptoes away from mubarak

The US government is clearly in a very awkward position vis-a-vis Egypt. For a long time Egypt has been not only strongest ally in the region against Al Qaeda. They have also kept the peace with Israel for over 30 years. With over $ 1.4 billion a year, only Afghanistan Iraq and Israel get more aid dollars. The US had been thinking about increasing aid to Egypt. According to a 2009 wikileaks diplomatic cable,

Our goal remains to widen our military cooperation
discussion beyond the annual flow of Foreign Military Financing.

Since the riots broke, the US has tried to distance itself somewhat from Mubarak
Hilary Clinton talked about the need to allow the people of Egypt to peacefully assemble and access to social media such as facebook and twitter. Their most consequential action to date has been their decision to review the US's aid package to Egypt. In other areas, the Obama administration has hedged its bets. It has balked at forcibly denouncing the violence. Also by advocating reform as opposed to the revolution wanted by the people, the United States reveals its preference for a slow democratization process over an uncontrolled revolution. The bottom line is that the US will probably be a bystander during this revolt. The opposition will not have US support like they did in Tunisia.

Here is a cool graphic from le monde detailing the amazing level of corruption in the Ben Ali clan,

http://abonnes.lemonde.fr/tunisie/infographie/2011/01/19/le-clan-ben-ali-une-mafia-a-la-tete-de-l-etat_1467893_1466522.html

The US role in the Tunisian Revolution

General Rashid Ammar

During the Jasmine revolution that swept Ben Ali from power, the United States played a pivotal behind the scenes role. While this story has been largely neglected by news sources in the US, it has become big news in both France and Tunisia. The story first broke after the astounding revelation of the French Foreign secretary. While under heavy scrutiny for her response to the street demonstrations, Alliot-Marie admitted that,

“We in the Elysee did not see this coming. It was the Americans who took matters in hand. They were convinced that the survival of the regime though violence, would plant the seeds for the Islamists. The U.S. military talked with their Tunisian Counterpart and Ben Ali was asked to leave the territory without further delay.”

According to Middle East expert Mathieu Guidere, the US ambassador met with Major General Rashid Ammar, and told him that the United States no longer would support Ben Ali. (A US Wikileak cable characterized the regime as Mafioso, so this could not have been a big surprise.) We do not know exactly what was said, but it was clear that afterward, the Tunisian General suddenly took matters into his own hands and told Ben Ali that he would refuse any order to attack the street demonstrators and was summarily sacked. But with the army in clear defiance, Ben Ali was on a plane for Saudi Arabia in less than 24 hours. General Ammar has not only regained his position, but is an important force in the upcoming election.

Many are characterizing Tunisia as a “clarion call for a regional awakening,” yet the important role of the US during the coup raises questions about whether this revolution could reproduce in neighboring Arab countries. The speed of the coup was not a result of the intensity of the demonstration but rather because of an agreement between the military and the US, which left Ben Ali isolated. His only support was the large, unwieldy and demoralized police and security forces which were no match for the size and intensity of the demonstrators back by the Tunisian Army. For this reason Tunisia can be seen as a special case, because the regime could not count on the support from its own Army, nor could it drum up islamophobia to draw in Western support. The lack of extremist Islamic elements in Tunisia meant that the United States could not be compelled to come to Ben Ali’s rescue. On the contrary, because the demonstrations were largely made up of pro democratic progressive students, the US felt that the safest action was to work with anti-Ben Ali elements in the military to bring the revolution to fruition.

top ten composers

ANTHONY TOMMASINI has an intriguing blog entry trying to rank the top ten greatest classical composers. His first chose J. S. Bach is extremely fitting. Almost every aspiring musician has played at one time or another Bach. (As a young child playing the recorder, I can remember struggling with his simple studies.) Bach was writing at a crossroads, when modal counterpoint of the earlier period was beginning to go out of style, and the new style based on major and minor harmonization that would dominate western music for the next 300 hundred years. Bach defined this eclectic late baroque period, with some pieces hearkening back to the earlier period and many other pointing in the new direction. All of this to say that he definitely deserves to be on any top ten list.

here are a couple of interesting link:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/arts/music/09composers.html?pagewanted=2&ref=arts. This is the

Here is Bach's choral es ist ginug: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iwpwr0MYNWc&feature=related

and Berg's violine concerto which uses parts of the Bach choral: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YbaPQ9956UE&feature=related